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Regional Powers and Leadership in Regional 
Institutions:
Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC
Merran Hulse
Abstract 
Regional powers are not always benevolent leaders when it comes to the building of regional institutions. 
While powerful states – particularly the “new” rising powers – may have a vested interest in regionalism as 
a means of projecting influence, regional powers may behave as coercive or benevolent leaders, or alterna-
tively display an absence of leadership altogether. The drivers of varying regional power behavior can be at-
tributed to their competing concerns regarding (economic) power, functional efficiency, international legit-
imacy, and neopatrimonial networks. This paper explores the varying behavior of Nigeria and South Africa 
in relation to the institutionalization of free trade areas and regional courts within their respective regions. 
Nigeria has displayed little leadership in ECOWAS trade integration due to domestic opposition; however, a 
newly-democratic Nigeria’s search for international legitimacy drove the establishment of the ECOWAS Court 
of Justice. Likewise, South Africa’s search for legitimacy drove its support for the SADC Tribunal, but the com-
peting demands of different audiences led it to abandon this support. South Africa has also displayed lead-
ership in relation to the SADC Free Trade Area; however, its neighbors perceive it as a self-interested, almost 
coercive actor. The findings suggest that the motivations for regional powers’ behavior vary across time and 
policy sectors, and that inconsistent behavior is driven by a change in the priority granted to different drivers. 
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1. Introduction1 
There is a growing body of literature on regional powers – emerging or rising states that clearly dominate 
their geographic sub-regions and are assumed to strongly influence the nature and contours of regional 
governance (cf. Pederson 2002; Nolte 2010; Jordaan 2003). The majority of this literature assumes that 
these powerful states engage in leadership of their regions: that they take on more than their fair share of 
the costs of providing regional governance, and do the work of persuading and socializing other states into 
participating in regional governance structures (Nolte 2010; Shoeman 2003; Burges 2008). In short, they 
are often assumed to be states that take the lead, and moreover, that such regional power leadership is 
required for the successful establishment of regional institutions (Mattli 1999). 
More recent research has noted that regional powers sometimes fail to live up to the expectations of re-
gional leadership (Prys 2010; Destradi 2010; Schirm 2006). India proved disinterested in cooperating with 
international partners to resolve conflicts in Sri Lanka in 2000 and 2006 (Prys 2009). Both Brazil and South 
Africa failed to provide leadership in trade integration as a result of their preference for unilateral economic 
action (Krapohl et al. 2014). Yet at other times, regional powers have proved both willing and able to tackle 
political and economic challenges within their region. Nigeria was instrumental in putting together a re-
gional peacekeeping force to end Sierra Leone’s civil war in 1990, while Brazil contributed the heavy lifting 
in the creation of the South American Defense Council in 2008. 
The existing literature offers little insight into explaining variation in the behavior of regional powers, and 
little insight into the apparent puzzle of why regional powers are sometimes benevolent leaders spear-
heading the establishment of mutually-beneficial regional institutions, at other times “selfish giants” that 
use institutions to benefit themselves at the expense of others, and in other cases abdicate any leadership 
role at all. Why would a regional power be a benevolent leader in one sector and a selfish, coercive dom-
inator in another? And in cases in which the regional power displays neither leadership nor domination, 
how do regional institutions get off the ground, without the driving force of a powerful state? This paper 
addresses these interrelated questions by investigating the inconsistent behavior of Nigeria and South 
Africa within their regions. I observe variation between regions, across policy sectors, and over time. A brief 
empirical investigation of four cases suggests that Nigeria has abdicated any leading role in the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Trade Liberalization Scheme, and although it has displayed 
some benevolent leadership in relation to the ECOWAS Court of Justice, it is likely to have influenced the 
Court’s unusual design features in order to protect domestic interests. South Africa’s behavior in the estab-
lishment of Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) free trade agreement verges on coercive 
and generates high levels of resistance from secondary states. On the other hand, it displayed benevolent 
leadership in relation to the establishment of the SADC Tribunal, but when the court was challenged by its 
regional rival Zimbabwe, South Africa failed to exercise leadership in preventing the dissolution of the court. 
1 Many thanks to the participants of the weekly KFG Jour Fixe seminars, especially Brooke Coe, Tanja Börzel, Stephano 
Palestini, Kathleen Hancock, and Jeff Checkel, who all provided valuable criticism on earlier drafts. All remaining 
shortcomings and errors are my own.
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The paper first explores the concept of a regional power and notes that regional powers are not always 
benevolent leaders invested in the provision of regional public goods. The following section discusses three 
ideal-types of regional power behavior within the context of regional institutionalization: benevolent lead-
ership, coercive domination, and absence of leadership. The potential drivers of regional power behavior 
are then discussed in terms of the power, institutional efficiency, legitimacy, and rent-seeking concerns of 
regional powers. The empirical discussion asks to what extent Nigeria and South Africa fulfill the require-
ments of regional powerhood, or “power over resources,” a precondition for regional leadership. The fol-
lowing section describes the behavior of the two countries in relation to the institutionalization of regional 
trade agreements and regional courts within their respective regions and explores the potential drivers 
underpinning their behavior. The findings highlight that regional powers often display highly inconsistent 
behavior, driven by competing demands originating at the domestic and international levels. 
2. Regional Powers 
At a minimum, a regional power is a state that belongs to a distinct geographic region, has superiority in 
power capabilities, and exercises some form of influence over the region (Destradi 2010: 908). Much of the 
literature on the new regional powers goes beyond this minimal definition to include aspects of leadership 
as part of the criteria states must meet in order to be considered a regional power. Detlef Nolte (2010) 
claims that a state must articulate a self-conception of having a leading position within the region, articu-
late a common regional identity, provide collective goods, and act as a representative of regional interests 
in international fora in order to be considered a regional power. All of these criteria imply a (benevolent) 
leadership function on behalf of the regional power.2 
However, a regional power’s capacity to lead (i.e., its material dominance) is not the same as its willingness 
to do so. As Hegemonic Stability theorists have shown, powerful states are sometimes unwilling to provide 
the leadership required to establish or maintain international institutions, despite having the capacity to 
do so (Kindleberger 1973; Mattli 1999). Furthermore, the type of leadership provided by powerful states 
may range from benevolent, self-enlightened forms of leadership to more coercive and exploitative forms 
(Kindleberger 1973; Lake 1993; Prys 2010; Destradi 2010). Several authors recognize the possibility of vari-
ance in the foreign policy behavior of regional powers, and that this is likely to have some effect on the 
ordering principles of regional orders and attendant institutions (Pederson 2002; Lake 2007; Destradi 2012). 
2 A brief note on the terms “power,” “hegemony,” and “leadership”: Power is the ability of one actor to influence 
another to do something they would not otherwise do (Dahl 1975), and although power has different “faces,” in-
cluding power-over-resources, power-over-ideas, and agenda-setting power (Lukes 1974), this paper understands 
power in simple terms as power-over-resources. Following Antonio Gramsci, hegemony implies an ideological 
dimension; of power-over-ideas, in addition to material power. A hegemon is therefore a materially dominant state 
that is able to impose its normative vision of global or regional order on others (Lake 2012: 557). Leadership is here 
understood to involve a state spearheading an international initiative, and convincing others to join (whether via 
coercive or non-coercive means). Leading states are not necessarily materially powerful states – there are many 
examples of international initiatives that have been championed by small or middle powers exercising normative 
power rather than material power. However, materially powerful states often are leading states. Given their mate-
rial dominance they have a greater potential to exercise leadership, by coercive or non-coercive means, whereas 
middle/small states do not have the material power to coerce others, only to persuade them. 
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Yet theoretical and empirical investigations that compare and contrast the varying behavior of regional 
powers remain somewhat neglected (Prys 2010). We know comparatively little about the drivers of re-
gional power behavior, and why regional powers may opt for leadership in some areas but not others, and 
what influences their decision to opt for benevolent versus coercive forms of leadership. This paper makes 
a first cut in addressing this gap.
Regional powerhood rests on having superior material capabilities in comparison to the rest of the region. 
The empirical fact of material dominance over a particular region does not include any assumption that 
powerful states ought to or actually do provide leadership within their regions. That said, the external 
world often perceives powerful states as having a special duty of care towards their sub-regions, and hold-
ing the expectation that the regional power should bear responsibility for maintaining peace and stability 
in its neighborhood (Schirm 2006). Likewise, regional powers often perceive themselves as having a special 
responsibility for the region and articulate conceptions of having a leading role to play. This may include 
references to the “special duties” and “responsibilities” of the state, and/or a general sense of exceptional-
ism (Prys 2010). Powerful states often articulate role conceptions of themselves as leaders of their regions 
and frequently claim to represent the interests of the region as a whole. Yet such states often fail to “put 
their money where their mouth is,” generating something of an expectations-reality gap (Destradi 2010; 
Prys 2010). 
On a scholarly level, some authors have suggested that the new regional powers (generally understood to 
include the BRICS and similar rising powers) have a vested interest in regional institutions. Rising powers 
tend to be revisionist states, favoring reform of existing international institutions so as to better reflect 
their interests (Jordaan 2003; Nel 2010). Although they are increasingly growing in confidence due to their 
strong economic growth over the past decade, rising powers are less stable and less assured of their global 
position than traditional middle powers. They are often beset by internal contradictions, such as unconsol-
idated democracy, inequality, and corruption, which have the potential to limit their unilateral projection 
of power (Bello 2014). Participation in regional cooperation can offer such states a means of overcoming 
their limitations and projecting power “on the cheap.” If they can obtain the forced or willing followship 
of neighboring states, regional powers can “borrow” strength and enhance their international legitimacy 
with the status of leader of the region. Regionalism can also provide a number of other benefits, such as 
a ready export market for the regional power’s goods; peace and stability effects; access to resources in 
neighboring states; and a forum for the diffusion of the regional power’s ideas, particularly as regards 
the “locking-in” of specific rules and standards that have been largely determined by the regional power 
(Pederson 2002). Regional powers may have an incentive to engage in leading behavior at the regional level, 
but it’s not a given that they will do so, nor is it predetermined what type of leadership behavior they will 
engage in. The theoretical framework developed in this paper assumes that the behavior of regional pow-
ers within the context of regional institutionalization is driven by their varying concerns over the balance of 
(economic) power, functional efficiency, legitimacy, or – in the case of African powers – the maintenance 
or expansion of neopatrimonial rent-seeking networks. Different drivers dominate different policy sectors 
and may change within a policy sector due to domestic reform or external shock, resulting in inconsistent 
behavior over space and time. Inconsistent behavior may also be the result of competing and conflicting 
foreign policy goals, which result in a form of “organized hypocrisy” on the part of the regional power.
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Regional powers are identified by their material dominance in comparison to other states in the region; by 
their share of the region’s collective GDP, population, and military power (Prys 2010). Using these or similar 
variables, most authors agree that Brazil, China, Russia, India, South Africa, and Nigeria constitute contem-
porary regional powers, with Australia, Germany, and Iran also sometimes included (Prys 2010: 486). In this 
context, a “region” is identified and defined by the presence of a multi-purpose regional organization that 
consists of three or more states in close geographic proximity, which cooperate to pursue collective aims 
within the framework of legally codified regional institutions. In this case “Southern Africa” is synonymous 
with the current membership of SADC and “West Africa” is synonymous with the current membership of 
ECOWAS.
3. Conceptualizing Regional Power Behavior in Relation to Regional Institutionalization
Hegemonic Stability theorists have observed that leadership may be benevolent or coercive (Snidal 1985; 
Lake 1993). They distinguish between benevolent and coercive leadership in terms of how the costs and 
benefits of cooperation are distributed among member states, with benevolent leaders bearing a dis-
proportionate share of the costs, and coercive leaders pushing the costs onto others (Lake 1993). Other 
Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) inspired approaches have noted that powerful states may abdicate lead-
ership – benevolent or coercive – altogether, becoming indifferent or “detached” powers uninterested 
in international cooperation (Kindleberger 1981; Prys 2010; Krapohl et al. 2014). Following the work of 
Sandra Destradi, Miriam Prys, and earlier HST theorists, three ideal-types of regional power behavior are 
discussed: benevolent leadership, coercive domination, and absence of leadership. In the context of insti-
tutionalized regional cooperation, benevolent leadership and coercive domination are a function of how 
transaction costs, the costs of institutional reproduction, and the benefits of cooperation are distributed 
among member states. Each type of behavior triggers a response from secondary states, which helps to 
identify the regional dynamics at play.3 Benevolent leadership tends to enjoy a degree of legitimacy among 
secondary states, generating willing followership and low levels of contestation; coercive domination tends 
to inspire subjugation or resistance and high levels of contestation; while an absence of leadership from 
a regional power may empower secondary states in their range of foreign policy (if passive disinterest 
from the regional power), or generate hostile resistance (if active obstruction from the regional power). 
Therefore, secondary states’ perceptions of the regional power are included as an indicator of its behavior 
(Schirm 2006). 
3 “Secondary states” refer to the smaller, less powerful states within a regional power’s sphere of influence. They 
may be genuine or coerced followers of the regional power, and often pose a degree of contestation and opposi-
tion to regional powers. 
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3.1 Benevolent Leadership 
According to HST, benevolent leadership involves a powerful state shouldering a disproportionate share of 
the costs of providing a public good, and therefore benefiting proportionately less than others. This occurs 
when/if the hegemon has a sufficient interest in the good to provide it unilaterally, without the contribu-
tions of others, and can therefore tolerate their free-riding (Snidal 1985). However, HST’s understanding of 
benevolent leadership is confined to the realm of political economy, limits the understanding of a public 
good to institutions that promote free trade, and interprets the driver of powerful state behavior as pure 
economic self-interest. Here the concept of benevolent leadership is broadened to include carrying “most 
of the burdens in the region and [collecting] contributions from secondary states, which are used for the 
production of common goods” (Prys 2010: 489). Common goods may include regional peace, political and 
economic stability, environmental accords, regional infrastructure, the creation of a consensus regarding 
regional issues, even an identifiable regional identity (Prys 2010: 494). Benevolent leadership is character-
ized by a high degree of commitment and continuity in foreign policy, and the consideration and inclusion 
of secondary states’ interests in regional institutions (Schirm 2006; Pederson 2002), as well as the distri-
bution of material costs and benefits that is either fair or skewered in favor of secondary states. A regional 
power exhibiting this type of behavior is largely accepted as a legitimate leader among secondary states, 
as indicated by freely-given followship (Schirm 2006, 2010). As all states benefit from the provision of the 
common good, the institutions set up under this style of leadership are considered legitimate and useful by 
member states, and compliance with its rules and standards should be relatively high, even in the absence 
of punitive enforcement mechanisms. Democratic regional powers are most likely to display benevolent 
leadership, as they are accustomed to internal processes of inclusiveness and accountability and are likely 
to externalize this culture in its regional foreign policy. 
3.2 Coercive Domination 
Coercive domination involves a powerful state forcing secondary states to bear the majority of the costs in 
establishing regional institutions as well as commanding and extracting involuntary tributes from second-
ary states via coercive means such as threat of force and/or other punitive measures (Destradi 2010). The 
lion’s share of the benefits of cooperation accrue primarily and disproportionately to the more powerful 
state, making coercive domination the hallmark of “selfish” or greedy hegemons. Regional powers who 
display coercive, dominating behavior are motivated by their own self-interest and give little consideration 
to the interests of secondary states. Consequently, institutions set up under this form of regional power 
behavior may resemble private goods more than common ones. Regional powers that opt for coercive 
domination lack legitimacy among secondary states. Dominance can only be sustained through coercion 
and imposition, making it, in the long-run, an expensive means of exercising influence over others, as “each 
application of coercion involves an expenditure of limited social capital and reduces the likelihood that the 
subject will comply without coercion in the future” (Hurd 1999: 385). Compliance is only grudgingly given, 
either out of fear or an analysis of the costs of non-compliance. Secondary states are quick to drop their 
compliance in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms (Hurd 1999). Domination breeds dissat-
isfaction among secondary states, which leads to (verbal) resistance, or subjugation if secondary states are 
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too weak to resist (Destradi 2010: 912). Authoritarian states are most likely to display coercive domination 
of their neighbors, as are states with poor relations with the rest of the region (e.g., Russia in the Eurasian 
Union, or Apartheid-era South Africa). 
3.3 Absence of Leadership  
A lack of leadership involves a spectrum of possible behavior, from passive disinterest to active obstruction 
or undermining of regional institutions. Regional powers may be uninterested in providing the leadership 
required to establish and maintain regional institutions if they perceive them to be of little benefit. Yet 
they may nevertheless passively participate in regional cooperation schemes initiated by other actors, if 
the costs are minor. On the other hand, regional powers may refuse to shoulder any costs at all, however 
minor, in which case they may become impediments to regional cooperation. At the most extreme, re-
gional powers may actively work to undermine existing regional institutions or obstruct the establishment 
of institutions proposed by other actors, if they perceive such cooperation initiatives to be a threat to 
their own interests. If institutions exist where regional powers do not provide leadership, leadership must 
then stem from elsewhere: either a coalition of willing secondary states, or from extra-regional actors, or 
perhaps a combination of both. This is where the openness of regional systems comes into play, and in the 
case of developing regions, external paymasters (donor agencies, external states, international organiza-
tions) may play a major role in explaining the existence of regional institutions in the absence of a powerful 
leading state. Regional powers that fail to display leadership in their regions have been described as de-
tached powers that lack identification with the broader region, such as Israel in the Middle East (Prys 2010); 
or “Rambos” that defect from regional cooperation in favor of economic cooperation with extra-regional 
partners, thereby leaving the region without an internal engine to drive cooperation (Krapohl et al. 2014). 
HST would suggest that under such conditions (unwilling hegemon, willing secondary states) cooperative 
institutions are unlikely to emerge, as secondary states do not have the resources to provide institutions 
without the assistance of a powerful state. But where secondary states have outside assistance in bearing 
the costs of cooperation, it may be possible to have regional institutions without the active involvement of 
the regional power.
Types of regional power behavior have already been explored on a conceptual level by several authors, but 
even these authors note that the factors underpinning regional powers’ decision-making processes about 
what type of strategy to pursue remains underexplored (Destradi 2010: 930). The following section makes 
a first cut at exploring potential drivers of regional power behavior, organized according to their concerns 
about (economic) power, institutional efficiency, international and domestic legitimacy, and – relevant for 
the African context – the maintenance and/or expansion of patronage networks.
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4. Drivers of Regional Power Behavior 
4.1 Power Concerns 
Drawn from neorealist and HST approaches, this first perspective understands regional power behavior 
as driven by insecurity in their global or regional position. Regional powers seek to establish regional in-
stitutions that reflect their self-interest in maintaining or increasing their share of world power (Rosato 
2011). Powerful states may be motivated to build regional institutions in response to a perceived security 
threat from beyond the region (Walt 1987). The EU’s origins in the post-War period can be interpreted as 
a Franco-German initiative to balance the Soviet Union (Wallace 1995; Rosato 2011), while Mercosur has 
been understood as a Brazilian initiative to counter US influence in South America (Gomez Mera 2005). 
Regionalism may also be driven by the perception of economic threat or uncertainty and the regional 
power’s subsequent efforts to maintain or improve its position in the global economy. Walter Mattli (1999) 
argued that national elites are only willing to cede sovereignty to regional institutions during times of 
economic uncertainty. This fits with the oft-noted “domino-effect” in regionalism, in which advances in 
integration in one region causes negative externalities for external states, thereby triggering an integrative 
response in other regions. Power concerns are likely to drive regional power behavior under conditions of 
economic or political uncertainty, and where there is a perception among national-decision makers that 
uncertainty could have negative effects on state interests. In such circumstances, we should expect na-
tional decision-makers to articulate a perception that there is an external threat to be addressed, and that 
regional cooperation is an appropriate solution to the identified threat. Policy-makers are perhaps more 
likely to adopt a “zero-sum” worldview under conditions of uncertainty (particularly in relation to security 
threats), making coercive forms of regional leadership more likely.  
4.2 Functional Efficiency Concerns 
Regional power behavior in relation to regional institutionalization may also be driven by a functional de-
mand from society. In this perspective, the drivers of regional power behavior are located on the domestic 
level rather than the systemic level. It assumes that states are rational and self-interested actors, but they rec-
ognize complex interdependencies with neighboring states and act collectively to solve collective problems. 
Regional institutions are assumed to satisfy a rational, functional demand, and to be designed accordingly.4 
Understanding state behavior in terms of their concern with institutional efficiency presupposes that pro-
cesses of globalization and regionalization beyond the control of the state generate a functional demand for 
regionalism among domestic interest groups. Interest groups then lobby the government, which aggregates 
4 Neofunctionalists and neoliberal intergovernmentalists understand state behavior in similar ways; however, they 
differ somewhat on how regional institutions are designed. Neofunctionalists assume regional powers are not 
necessarily in control of the design of institutions, and that design is driven by spill-over effects and technocratic 
authority. The chosen design of institutions reflects the demands of regulatory complexity; therefore, regional 
powers may adopt designs that do not necessarily reflect their interests, in the name of functional efficiency. On 
the other hand, intergovernmentalists assume institutional design reflects the interests of those states with the 
most bargaining power, which typically are those states with a “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (not 
necessarily the regional power). 
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competing societal interests into “the national interest” and acts accordingly, taking into account existing 
institutional constraints (Moravscik 1998; Putnam 1988). Interest groups may form transnational alliances 
to try to bypass national governments, and may form alliances with actors on the regional level in order to 
pressure national governments into ceding more authority to regional institutions, but ultimately the state 
remains the primary gatekeeper of integration. In some cases, there may be competing domestic demands, 
and the balance of winners versus losers is unclear, resulting in inconsistent state behavior. There is perhaps 
a liberal/Western bias in thinking about states’ motivations to participate in regionalism as driven by a func-
tional demand for institutional efficiency. (Semi-)authoritarian regimes with low levels of socio-economic 
development are less likely to facilitate the mobilization of domestic groups and represent their interests 
to the same degree as liberal, democratic regimes, and – where neopatrimonialism is prevalent – they are 
more likely to privilege unrepresentative niche interests over broader societal interests. 
4.3 Legitimacy and Signaling Concerns
Legitimacy-based explanations understand the drivers of state behavior as being grounded in actors’ sub-
jective beliefs about what is appropriate or morally correct (Mahoney 2000: 523). This perspective under-
stands regional power behavior as driven by their desire to be perceived as legitimate and credible in the 
eyes of others, to “do the right thing,” and enhance their legitimacy by making credible commitments to 
international norms and standards via regional institutionalization. On the economic side, states may sig-
nal their commitment to trade liberalization by setting up a regional dispute settlement mechanism, even 
if it is rarely used (Korte 2012). The establishment of such institutions can increase a region’s legitimacy as 
a destination for foreign direct investment, thereby encouraging development (Krapohl/Fink 2013). On the 
political side, newly democratized states may use regional institutions as a means to boost the fragile legit-
imacy of a new regime and signal commitment to ongoing democratic reform (Pevehouse 2005), thereby 
reassuring both domestic and international audiences. Legitimacy concerns may explain the establishment 
of regional institutions in the absence of functional demand or security concerns, and may also explain 
why authoritarian states sign up for democracy-promoting institutions as an exercise in “regime-boosting” 
(Söderbaum 2004). The behavior of regional powers is most likely to be driven by legitimacy concerns in the 
immediate aftermath of processes of domestic reform, either economic or political, and benevolent lead-
ership is the most likely strategy, as it comes with the most legitimacy among secondary states. However, 
one should keep in mind that the audience for legitimacy can be domestic, regional, or international, and 
what plays well with one audience may not necessarily play well with another. Inconsistent behavior may 
therefore be the result of the competing demands of different audiences. 
4.4 Neopatrimonial Concerns
In the African context, state behavior may also be driven by neopatrimonialism and rent-seeking. 
Neopatrimonialism facilitates the emergence of a “shadow state”: informal, commercially-orientated net-
works that operate parallel to, and often at odds with, government bureaucracies (Reno 1995). The shadow 
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state is controlled by a personalistic leader and does not conform to codified rules, its main aim being to 
ensure a supply of resources that can be distributed via patron-client networks in order to maintain the 
office-holder’s position of authority. Fulfillment of the obligations of public office is often subordinate to 
individual office-holders’ private interests, and public office is frequently used as a means of accumulat-
ing private wealth. The New Regionalisms Approach (NRA) has pointed out that formal regionalism can 
contribute to the regionalization of the shadow state, creating a shadow region that echoes the shadow 
state. This occurs when open regionalism encourages liberalization, reducing government revenue and 
rent-seeking opportunities, and therefore reducing the resources available for patronage. Under such con-
ditions, office-holders are incentivized to use regional frameworks to search for new rent-seeking opportu-
nities in neighboring countries (Söderbaum 2004; Fanta 2008). Regionalism then – like the state – consists 
of formal, codified institutions, and the accompanying informal networks that constitute the “dark side 
of regionalism” and which may be detrimental to formal efforts at cooperation. In West Africa, unofficial 
support to insurgents in neighboring countries has undermined formal efforts to establish regional peace 
(Fanta 2008), while the decision to include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a member of SADC 
had more to do with opening up new “networks of plunder” for Zimbabwean elites than advancing SADC’s 
formal integration agenda (Maclean 2003). Critical examination of the “national interest” is therefore of the 
utmost importance, since what is presented as the national interest is often the interests of a niche rentier 
class or the personalistic interests of relevant decision-makers (Söderbaum 2004). Neopatrimonialism and 
rent-seeking may be a factor in accounting for the sometimes puzzling or “irrational” aspects of region-
alism in Africa and elsewhere. Unusual design features or a lack of implementation may be intended to 
protect existing patronage networks, while decisions about membership might be motivated more by the 
search for new rent-seeking opportunities than cultural, political, or geographic affinity.
5. Nigeria and South Africa as Regional Powers
Material dominance is a precondition for regional leadership. The material dominance of Nigeria and South 
Africa in relation to their regions is analyzed using the Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities 
Index (NMCI) and the IMF’s data on Gross Domestic Product.5 Taking a snapshot view of Nigeria and South 
Africa’s material power in relation to their broader regions reveals that Nigeria is more powerful in West 
Africa than South Africa is in the southern African region (see Figures 1 and 2). The view over time (1980 to 
2014) illustrates that South Africa’s relative material power, in terms of both GDP and NMCI, has declined 
over time, whilst Nigeria’s has either remained steady or actually increased in relation to the broader re-
gion (see Figure 3). As of 2014, when the Nigerian economy was rebased, Nigeria’s share of regional GDP 
stands at 80 percent of the total, while South Africa’s share has decreased steadily since it joined SADC in 
1995.
5 The National Material Capabilities Index amalgamates six indicators of material capability: military expenditure, 
military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population.
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Figure 1: Relative Material Power of Nigeria and South Africa, 2007
 
Source: Correlates of War – The National Material Capabilities Index.
Figure 2: Nigeria’s and South Africa’s Share of Regional GDP, 2014
 
Source: IMF World Economic Database, October 2014. 
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Figure 3: Nigeria’s and South Africa’s Relative Power, 1980-2014. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Correlates of War and IMF World Economic Database.
Clearly, both Nigeria and South Africa are materially dominant within their regions. Yet they have histori-
cally displayed very different patterns of leadership in their respective regions. Nigeria was uninterested 
in playing a leading role in West Africa in the immediate post-Independence period. It pursued a regional-
ly-isolated and pro-Western foreign policy, perceiving its neighbors as too small or ideologically radical to 
be relevant to its own development (Ihonvbere 1991). However, neighboring countries’ support to Biafran 
rebels during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–70) and the failure of Western allies to support the beleaguered 
government caused Nigerian policy-makers to adopt a more interventionist approach to regional affairs. In 
the 1970s, Nigerian scholars and policy-makers began to articulate a vision of Nigeria’s “manifest destiny” 
to lead not only West Africa, but also Africa as a whole (Ihonvbere 1991; Adebajo 2000; Bach 2007). Under 
the leadership of General Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian policy-makers conceived of the idea of a regional eco-
nomic organization that would encompass the region’s Anglophone and Francophone states, would serve 
as a vehicle for Nigerian interests, and would counterbalance French influence in the region. Neighboring 
states were initially reluctant to sign up to ECOWAS, but Nigeria’s newfound oil wealth was able to finance 
infrastructure projects, interest-free loans, political donations, and economic investments in neighboring 
countries, convincing skeptical states to join ECOWAS (Ihonvbere 1991: 519). As such, ECOWAS has always 
been an exercise in Nigerian hegemony, although the scale and ambition of the country’s leadership has 
fluctuated with its periods of democratic transition and reversal, as well as its economic fortunes. The 
oil-fueled buoyancy of the 1970s, when ambitious protocols on trade liberalization and the free movement 
of people were signed, was followed by the economic stagnation and unstable military juntas of the 1980s, 
which coincided with a period of stagnation within ECOWAS. It was not until the 2000s, after transition 
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to democratic rule under the stewardship of Olusegun Obasanjo, that Nigeria again began to articulate 
a strong leadership role for itself, both within ECOWAS and the African Union. Nigeria has subsequently 
played a strong leadership role in ECOWAS’ security sector, but the ambition to lead does not extend to 
trade, where the country has proven to be a difficult and obstructionist actor. Nigeria remains hampered by 
the systemic corruption and low levels of government efficiency that characterize neopatrimonial regimes 
(Cilliers et al. 2015, see Figure 4), which may account for seemingly “irrational” or inefficient domestic and 
foreign policies (Henderson 2015: 131). Therefore, we might expect rent-seeking to be a significant factor 
in explaining Nigeria’s behavior in relation to ECOWAS. 
South Africa’s leadership ambitions within southern Africa have followed a different trajectory. Apartheid-
era South Africa engaged in coercive leadership through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and 
had ambitions to expand its domination of southern Africa through a planned Constellation of Southern 
African States. SADC itself was never a hegemonic project initiated and driven by a regional power; rather, 
it was a counter-hegemonic organization explicitly designed to oppose and undermine the dominance of 
a hostile regional power. As a result of this historical legacy, democratic South Africa avoids making explicit 
claims to regional or continental leadership, as South African elites are highly cognizant of abstaining from 
any behavior reminiscent of the Apartheid years (Flemes 2009). Yet clearly South Africa does have lead-
ership ambitions, as evidenced by its promotion of “big ideas” such as the African Renaissance and the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),6 the fiercely fought election of South African diplomat 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the position of chairperson of the African Union, and the recent establishment 
of the South African Development Partnership Agency. Yet its leadership ambitions are viewed with suspi-
cion in African capitals, and Pretoria is often perceived as an aggressive and self-interested actor pursuing 
its regional trade agenda. As South Africa is a democratic regional power with a legitimacy-deficit on the 
African continent, it is perhaps more likely to engage in benevolent regional leadership driven by a legiti-
macy/signaling logic. As the country performs well on governance indicators (see Figure 4), rent-seeking is 
unlikely to play a significant role in its regional foreign policy, and it is also more likely to take the demands 
of domestic interest groups into account in foreign policy-making. 
6 The African Renaissance is an intellectual concept advocating Africa’s economic, political, and cultural potential, 
which was championed by Thabo Mbeki during his term in office. Connected to the idea of the African Renaissance, 
NEPAD is an ambitious plan for Africa’s economic development, which formally became a part of the African Union 
agenda in 2001. 
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Figure 4: Governance Indicators, Nigeria and South Africa, 2014
 
Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators.
6. Preliminary Case Studies 
6.1 Nigeria’s Behavior in the ECOWAS Trade Integration Agenda: No Leadership
Although ECOWAS was initiated by Nigeria and originally conceived as an economic integration project 
(Bach 1983), Nigeria has displayed an absence of leadership in relation to the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization 
Scheme (ETLS), at times even behaving in an obstructionist fashion. Nevertheless, ECOWAS currently has a 
free trade area in place and in January 2015 began implementing a customs union, as per the terms of the 
ETLS. The institutionalization of a Free Trade Area (FTA) and customs union could be considered somewhat 
surprising in the face of a reluctant regional power, but in this case it can be explained by the agenda-set-
ting influence of the secondary states, in conjunction with external pressure from the EU.
Nigeria repeatedly delayed intra-regional negotiations towards the free trade area and customs union 
(Olayiwola et al. 2015: 33). The ETLS agenda was first set out in a protocol in 1979, but it was not until 
1999 that any significant progress was made, when the ECOWAS Authority adopted a fast-track approach 
to economic integration. This could not have been adopted without Nigeria’s consent, as its size and influ-
ence make it a veto-player at meetings of the ECOWAS executive. The Authority’s newfound enthusiasm 
for trade integration seems to have been spurred by the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s 
(UEMOA) progress on its own integration agenda: at that point it was close to finalizing its own external 
tariff, and Anglophone states, Nigeria included, would have been keen to play “catch-up” to avoid allowing 
the UEMOA states to determine the baseline for a future ECOWAS-wide external tariff. However, the fast-
track initiative was unsuccessful, as UEMOA completed its external tariff in 2000, one year ahead of the 
ECOWAS timeline. Three years later, UEMOA and ECOWAS embarked on intra-regional negotiations for an 
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ECOWAS-wide external tariff. Negotiations again floundered for several years due to Nigeria’s reluctance to 
adopt UEMOA’s tariff bands as the baseline for the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) (de Roquefeuil et 
al. 2014: 7; Ukaoka 2008; Okon 2015). This situation might have continued indefinitely had it not been for 
parallel trade negotiations with the EU to conclude an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). It became 
obvious that ECOWAS required a CET in order to conclude an EPA that preserved ECOWAS’ existing level of 
integration and official raison d’être. Unilateral ultimatums issued by the EU for the conclusion of EPAs by 
October 2014 forced the ECOWAS agenda. Nigeria had little choice but to agree to adopt the UEMOA tariffs 
as the basis for the ECOWAS CET in order to reach agreement on the ECOWAS customs union (in January 
2014) and the EPA (in February 2014), or else risk the destruction of ECOWAS’ trade mandate.
Nigeria may have been cornered into formally adopting regional trade institutions it was not particularly 
keen on, but that does not mean it has to effectively implement them. Nigeria has the lowest rate of imple-
mentation of the ETLS in West Africa. Major impediments to the functioning of the ETLS in Nigeria include:
• The lack of legal recourse for violations of trade and free movement protocols as the ECOWAS Court of 
Justice does not allow direct access in trade-related issues (more on this issue below);
• The prevalence of corrupt customs officials at border posts to which the Nigerian government either 
turns a blind eye or actively participates in. The lack of legal redress encourages customs officials to 
erect illegal roadblocks and demand informal payments from traders, contravening ECOWAS rules 
(ECOWAS Vanguard 2013). A Chatham House report notes that unofficial “taxation” on cross-border 
trade has become a “rich source of revenue for patronage networks” within Nigeria’s state agencies 
(Hoffman/Melly 2015: viii). 
• The lack of information and transparency surrounding trader’s rights under community law. It is diffi-
cult to locate information of national laws and procedures relating to the ETLS. Traders do not have ac-
cess to information concerning their rights, and the lack of transparency and information contributes 
to delays and informal payments at control points. 
This ambivalence and lack of implementation and enforcement has caused Nigeria’s neighbors to become 
deeply frustrated and disillusioned with the idea of Nigerian leadership. Ghanaian President John Mahama 
has accused Nigeria of being a “protectionist bully,” acting as a barrier to regional trade and development 
(quoted in Udoh 2015: 34). Likewise, the African Development Bank has called on the country “to play a more 
prominent role in moving forward the regional agenda with a view to accelerating regional trade” (African 
Development Bank Group 2012: 8), while European trade partners have also accused Nigeria of impeding 
the ECOWAS integration agenda, “sitting like an elephant in the middle of the road” of intra-regional and 
inter-regional negotiations (EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, quoted in Leadership Nigeria 2007). 
Clearly Nigeria does not fulfil a leadership role in trade integration within ECOWAS. The reasons for this 
are rooted in Nigeria’s domestic politics, involving a mix of legitimate opposition from interest groups, 
and rent-seeking interests. Regional trade liberalization would threaten Nigeria’s nascent manufactur-
ing sector, which focuses on producing goods for its large domestic market. Interest groups such as the 
National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS) and the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN) are 
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well-organized, extremely vocal, and almost universally opposed to trade liberalization, both within the 
context of ECOWAS and the EPA with the EU (Ukaoh 2008). Furthermore, effective implementation of the 
ETLS would challenge the systemic corruption that takes place at Nigeria’s borders. The beneficiaries of 
these corrupt practices have a vested interest in lobbying against the removal of trade barriers and in limit-
ing traders’ access to information and legal remedies. ECOWAS’ integration agenda has instead been driven 
by the more integrated and liberally-orientated UEMOA states, who have successfully managed to “upload” 
their standards to ECOWAS. Nigeria cannot fully opt out of ECOWAS trade integration, as doing so would 
hollow out its own hegemonic project. Instead, it reluctantly participates while employing various formal 
and informal means to delay or impede the process of liberalization (lack of legal redress, turning a blind 
eye and/or active collusion in corruption at the border posts). It would appear that Nigeria’s ambivalence 
towards trade integration has even spilled over into other sectors, influencing the design of the regional 
dispute settlement mechanism, the ECOWAS Court of Justice. 
6.2 Nigeria’s Behavior in Relation to the Court of Justice: (Qualified) Benevolent Leadership 
In many respects, the ECOWAS Court of Justice (ECCJ) is a very progressive and intrusive regional court. It 
acquired a human rights jurisdiction in 2005 and since then has issued several ground-breaking rulings 
against member states, including Nigeria, in human rights matters. The Court allows direct access for indi-
viduals and NGOs in human rights matters, and is somewhat unusual among other regional courts in that 
it does not require the exhaustion of domestic remedies (Alter et al. 2013). It is also unusual in another 
respect: unlike other regional courts that allow individual access, the ECCJ’s jurisdiction does not cover eco-
nomic or trade-related cases. Individual access to the court is restricted to cases concerning human rights 
only. This is an unusual design feature for a court originally set up as one of the institutions of a purely eco-
nomic organization and one which allows individual access in human rights matters, traditionally a more 
sensitive and sovereignty-infringing area than trade. Here I argue that the newly-democratizing Nigeria of 
the late-1990s and early 2000s, in search of greater international legitimacy, drove the operationalization 
of the court and its expansion into human rights matters. Yet at the same time, Nigeria’s ambivalence 
regarding trade integration resulted in the unusual design feature restricting individual access in trade and 
economic matters. 
The 1975 Treaty creating ECOWAS called for the establishment of a regional court. At this point, ECOWAS 
was envisaged as a purely economic organization, and the proposed court was not intended to have any hu-
man rights jurisdiction. Even the economic rights and freedoms associated with the economic integration 
that ECOWAS aimed to achieve were not framed in terms of the rights of citizens, in order to avoid any link 
with human rights (Ebobrah 2010). It was not until 1991 that a protocol for the proposed court was drawn 
up. The protocol only allowed for inter-state disputes and disputes involving the institutions of ECOWAS 
and member states regarding the interpretation of community rules. In July 1993, the ECOWAS Authority 
signed a Revised Treaty, which officially introduced human rights into the ECOWAS mandate, in line with 
the African Charter. From this point on, there was no doubt that ECOWAS’ mandate encompassed more 
than the initial economic mandate. Subsequent protocols make clear references to human right instru-
ments and use unambiguous rights language (Ebobrah 2010: 4). This expansion of ECOWAS and the court’s 
           Regional Powers and Leadership in Regional Institutions | 21
(future) mandate took place during one of Nigeria’s short-lived attempts to transition from military rule to 
democratic government. After a wave of strikes and protests against military rule, General Babangida was 
forced to hand power to a transitional government in June 1993. The ECOWAS Revised Treaty was signed 
the following month, perhaps as part of a signaling exercise to the international community. However, the 
transitional government was overthrown by a coup a few months later, in November 1993, and there were 
no further developments in the operationalization of the ECCJ until the democratic transition to the Fourth 
Nigerian Republic in 1999, when Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn in as Head of State. Almost immediately 
Obasanjo sought to repair Nigeria’s international reputation, damaged by years of military dictatorship, 
by reviving Nigeria’s leadership of ECOWAS and getting the long-planned court off the ground (Iliffe 2011; 
Alter et al. 2013). It was only after this point that the ECCJ actually became operational. A building in Abuja 
was found, a budget assigned, and judges sworn in by January 2001. 
The court’s first case, Afrolabi vs Nigeria, was lodged in 2003. It was brought by a private trader against 
the government of Nigeria, who alleged that Nigeria had violated ECOWAS rules on the free movement 
of goods and people by allowing the collection of illegal tolls by government officials at border posts. The 
Nigerian government challenged the court’s jurisdiction in the matter, on the grounds that existing pro-
tocols did not allow for individual access to the court. According to legal experts, the judges could have 
made an expansive reading of the relevant protocols to expand their jurisdiction and rule on the matter 
(Ebobrah 2010); however, they opted for a cautious approach and strict reading of the existing provisions, 
eventually dismissing the case. Subsequently, the President of the court called for the court’s jurisdiction 
to be expanded to enable individual access (Banjo 2007). Accordingly, in November 2004, the ECOWAS 
Authority considered draft amendments to the Court Protocol, and as a result, a Supplementary Protocol 
was adopted three months later. The Supplementary Protocol allowed for individual access and an ex-
plicit human rights mandate. Surprisingly, the 2005 reform of the court did not allow individual access for 
private traders. Alter et al. (2013) note that Nigeria raised no objection to the inclusion of a human rights 
jurisdiction for the court, but the fact that “states declined to extend private litigant access to economic 
cases […] suggests a careful choice about which types of suits private litigants would be permitted to file” 
(Alter et al. 2013: 776). The decision means that private traders have no legal recourse to challenge their 
government’s failure to implement the ETLS, and that patronage networks that benefit from cross-border 
corruption remain intact.
It would appear that Nigeria displayed some benevolent leadership in relation to the court. The operation-
alization of the ECCJ preceded in fits and starts alongside Nigeria’s uneven democratization process, most 
likely driven by the country’s search for enhanced legitimacy as an African leader. Yet it is also likely that 
Nigeria influenced the design of the court so as to restrict access in areas that could threaten domestic 
rent-seeking interests, making for qualified benevolent leadership behavior. 
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6.3 South Africa’s Behavior in SADC Trade Integration: Coercive(ish) Leadership 
South Africa has undoubtedly been the driving force behind SADC’s free trade area (Mansfield/Milner 
2012; Krapohl et al. 2014). However, its leadership is perceived as self-interested and subject to a significant 
degree of resentment and resistance from neighboring states, which has manifested in overlap and conflict 
with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a rival trade integration project 
championed by Zimbabwe. SADC lacked a concrete integration agenda until South Africa joined the orga-
nization in 1994. Almost immediately after joining, South Africa tried to address the overlap problem by 
pressuring states that were members of both SADC and COMESA to “exercise their sovereign right to with-
draw from COMESA,” as COMESA was deemed “too politically, economically and culturally diverse, making 
it too complex and unwieldy to manage” (SADC 1994: 15). In September 1995, at South Africa’s insistence, 
the SADC Summit declared dual membership of SADC and COMESA incompatible (Gibb 1998). Lesotho and 
Mozambique announced their intention to withdraw from COMESA starting 1997, while Tanzania (2000), 
Namibia (2004), and Angola (2007) withdrew from COMESA at a later date. However, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, the Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe retained their membership of both SADC and 
COMESA.
In August 1996, the African National Congress (ANC) government adopted its very first foreign policy doc-
ument, entitled “A Framework for Cooperation in Southern Africa.” It envisaged a high degree of economic 
cooperation and joint planning to lead to the integration of southern Africa (Saurombe 2010). That same 
month, South Africa was elected Chair of SADC for a three-year term, and the SADC Trade Protocol was 
signed. The Protocol entered into force in January 2000, after ratification by eleven member states, and 
implementation began several months later. Progress, however, was slow, and in 2006, the SADC Summit 
convened in Johannesburg to review SADC’s integration efforts. South Africa reportedly pushed for mea-
sures to accelerate the pace of integration, promoting a “fast-growth, big-push model” (Landesberg 2015: 
127). The minimal condition of 85 percent liberalization was met in 2008, and the FTA was fully realized in 
2012 after the phase-down period for sensitive goods was completed. Somewhat surprisingly, the FTA was 
achieved within the scheduled time frame, driven mainly by SACU and South Africa’s offer of tariff-free 
access to the SACU market to other SADC members, while other SADC states retain tariffs on South African 
goods (Sandrey 2013). However, SADC’s trade integration has not been able to progress past the FTA stage. 
Little progress has been made on the planned customs union, which was originally scheduled for comple-
tion in 2010. 
South Africa’s changing role within the SACU should also be considered part and parcel of SADC integra-
tion. The original organization was a colonial, and later Apartheid-era construct designed to benefit South 
Africa by providing a captive market for its uncompetitive manufactured goods. In the 1990s, a newly 
democratic South Africa agreed to democratize the SACU Agreement and compensate Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, and Namibia for SACU’s deindustrializing effects by providing them with a disproportionate 
share of the revenue generated by SACU. This could be interpreted as a move from coercive to benevolent 
leadership, but South Africa is still perceived as a self-interested actor that blocks the implementation of 
policies and institutions (such as a tariff board and tribunal) intended to grant smaller states a voice in 
SACU policy. Furthermore, in 1999, South Africa unilaterally entered into trade negotiations with the EU 
without consulting the other members of SACU, which eventually allowed European goods to enter their 
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markets “through the backdoor.” As a result, whatever leadership South Africa does display in regional 
trade liberalization tends to be perceived as being more about capturing a greater market share for the 
competitive sectors of its economy, rather than promoting genuine economic development in the region. 
Many states are unwilling to follow South Africa into regional arrangements that they fear will create a 
greater economic reliance on South Africa (Draper et al. 2007). Many states were reluctant to sign up to the 
FTA, and when it did not result in immediate increases in intra-regional trade, many began to renege on the 
terms of the agreement and started to erect non-tariff barriers to trade (Wentworth n. d.). 
So while South Africa has both the ability and willingness to lead the region on trade matters, neighboring 
states perceive South Africa as a self-interested actor that does not have their best interests at heart. Many 
SADC states fear a South African “takeover” of their domestic economies, and already South African compa-
nies have spread first to SACU and more recently to Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
(Saurombe 2010). Furthermore, the liberalization and free-market principles of the SADC trade agenda 
present a threat of deindustrialization in some countries, especially Zimbabwe and Zambia. Unsurprisingly, 
it has often been Zimbabwe spearheading COMESA’s rival integration agenda. Its competing customs union 
was launched in June 2009, under the chairmanship of Robert Mugabe, despite some COMESA member 
states expressing they were not adequately prepared for the customs union (Lusaka Times 2009).7 This is 
indicative of the “hedging strategies” on the part of some member states to influence how the integration 
agendas of the various regional initiatives turn out, leading to “a regional race to consolidate customs 
unions in the region” (Draper et al. 2007: 17). South Africa is still trying to consolidate and harmonize the 
various overlapping integration agendas within southern Africa. It appears to be the driving force behind 
the SADC–COMESA–East African Community (EAC) Tripartite Alliance, which aims to harmonize the various 
initiatives with the eventual aim of constructing first an FTA, then a customs union, that stretches from 
Cape Town to Cairo. The priorities of the Tripartite Alliance mirror those of South Africa’s own policy doc-
uments, including the New Growth Path, the National Development Plan, and the Industrial Policy Action 
Plans (Wentworth n. d.), but whether its leadership can prevail in the face of substantial resistance from 
secondary states remains to be seen.  
6.4 South Africa’s Behavior in Relation to the SADC Tribunal: First Benevolent Leadership, 
then no Leadership
Provision for the SADC Tribunal was first made in the 1992 Treaty which transformed SADCC8 into SADC. 
South Africa was not a member of SADC then, and therefore was likely not involved in this initial decision 
on dispute settlement. At the time, member states were concerned about the potential erosion of na-
tional sovereignties by the court, and the Summit agreed internally that the court would be one of “the 
central intergovernmental organs of the community” (SADC Council of Ministers 1992, quoted in Lenz 
2012). At this point, the court was intended for inter-state disputes only. Eight years later, in August 2000, 
7 The EAC countries dropped out of the COMESA customs union shortly afterwards in order to form their own 
customs union. 
8 Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).
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the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal was signed, and essentially copied the design of the European Court of 
Justice (Fanenbruck/Meissner 2015). By this point, the right of individual access was included as a central 
design feature, going well beyond the inter-state dispute settlement mechanism originally envisaged. 
Available evidence suggests that the decision to adopt such a sovereignty-infringing design for the Tribunal 
was spurred by the desire to obtain greater legitimacy in the eyes of external donors and investors and to 
attract more donor funding (Lenz 2012). It is worth noting that the Tribunal Protocol entered into force in a 
manner that deviated from SADC’s usual procedure. Observers felt that the Tribunal Protocol might never 
obtain the number of ratifications required to enter into force, so the decision was taken that the Tribunal 
Protocol would automatically enter into force alongside SADC’s 2001 Revised Treaty. Although there is no 
concrete evidence confirming South Africa’s particular involvement in these decisions, it should be pointed 
out that the early 2000s were a time at which South Africa was pursuing its big foreign policy ideas (the 
African Renaissance, NEPAD). A regional court with individual access and a potential mandate in human 
rights would have fit with the Mbeki government’s stated support for good governance, the rule of law and 
promotion of human rights. 
Perhaps more surprising is South Africa’s role in the suspension of the Tribunal after it had made several 
rulings against Zimbabwe’s land reform program. Incensed by the Tribunal’s rulings, Mugabe went on the 
offensive to have the court disbanded, even in the face of two reviews confirming the legality of the court’s 
establishment and the validity of its rulings against Zimbabwe (Hulse/van der Vleuten 2015). As the most 
powerful state in the region, and one which claims support for the rule of law and human rights as a cor-
nerstone of its foreign policy, South Africa could have exercised its veto power to prevent the suspension of 
the Tribunal. South Africa’s Deputy Justice Minister, Andries Nel, stated in April 2010 that
The South African Government is proud of, and unequivocal in our principled support for the SADC 
Tribunal as a legitimate constitutive institution of SADC and believe that it should be accorded all the 
support and respect needed to fulfill its functions. It is my contention that if we are to succeed in the 
various regional development matters, we must first and foremost ensure that justice is the bedrock of 
all our institutional frameworks [...] We must at all times safeguard jealously those institutions that we 
collectively have created (quoted in Fanenbruck/Meissner 2015: 14). 
However, the South African executive failed to exercise leadership in preventing the suspension of the 
Tribunal. South African President Jacob Zuma reportedly left the Summit meeting at which the decision to 
disband the Tribunal was taken, and raised no objection to its suspension and redesign. South Africa’s re-
fusal to defend the Tribunal can be explained partly by its difficulty in exercising regional leadership due to 
its past, and partly by South Africa’s domestic politics, both of which relate back to the Tribunal’s ruling on 
politically sensitive land reform issues. Mugabe is regarded as one of the heroes of the Liberation struggles, 
and South Africa’s former position as a pariah state, whose current leadership owes a symbolic debt to 
neighboring countries due to the destabilization they suffered at the hands of the Apartheid government, 
makes it nigh impossible for South Africa to openly criticize Mugabe (Hulse 2012). Secondly, domestic 
support for land reform is high in South Africa, and break-away parties from the ANC have expressed 
frustration with the slow rate of South African land reform, and support a Zimbabwe-style “fast-track” ap-
propriation of land. Condemning Mugabe’s actions and supporting the Tribunal might have risked fueling 
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domestic frustrations with land reform and undermining the ANC’s popular support. South Africa’s behav-
ior in relation to the Tribunal can be understood in terms of the competing demands for legitimacy in the 
eyes of international, regional, and domestic audiences. What plays well with an international audience 
(enforcing the rulings of a regional human rights court) may not play well with domestic and regional audi-
ences, and illustrates that regional powers at times have to strategically choose which audience to cater to. 
7. Conclusion
This paper illustrates that regional powers display inconsistent behavior in relation to regional institutional-
ization (see Table 1). Contrary to the implicit assumptions of much of the literature on regional powers, re-
gionally dominant states do not always play a benevolent leadership role in their regions. Nigeria displayed 
an absence of leadership in relation to the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme, by delaying negotiations, 
preventing the proper implementation of the agreement, and preventing access to legal remedies. Its re-
luctance to engage with the ETLS is driven by domestic opposition to regional trade integration, but never-
theless legitimacy concerns drove Nigeria to reluctantly sign up to both the FTA and the CET, the establish-
ment of which was driven by secondary states and supported by the EU. Nigeria displayed more benevolent 
leadership in the establishment and operationalization of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, driven by the newly 
democratic regime’s search for international legitimacy. However, the government may have influenced 
the court’s unusual design features in order to protect networks of patronage within state agencies. South 
Africa has undoubtedly been a leader in relation to SADC’s trade integration; however, it is perceived as a 
selfish and self-interested actor by secondary states. Its behavior in this realm is most likely driven by the 
country’s strong business interests and a mercantilist approach to growing the South African economy. On 
the other hand, a newly democratic South Africa in search of international legitimacy may have facilitated 
the establishment and operationalization of a regional court with individual access and a potential human 
rights mandate.9 However, it failed to protect the Tribunal when it was challenged by Zimbabwe, in order to 
retain legitimacy before regional and domestic audiences. The empirical findings in the four cases suggest 
that the behavior of regional powers in relation to regional courts seems to be motivated by regime change 
at the domestic level and the subsequent desire to signal a credible commitment to democracy, rule of 
law, and human rights, via the establishment of regional courts. However, as the case of the SADC Tribunal 
illustrates, different audiences may have different requirement for legitimacy, resulting in apparently in-
consistent behavior when the demands of different audiences’ clash. Regional power behavior in relation 
to trade integration is driven more by domestic interest groups and external (economic) pressures, both 
from secondary states within the region, and extra-regional actors. 
9 More detailed investigation of the establishment and operationalization of the Tribunal is required in order to 
determine South Africa’s exact role in the drafting of the protocol and the revised Treaty which brought the Tribunal 
to life without ratification by member states. 
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Table 1: Cases
Case Behavior of regional power Most relevant driver(s) 
ECOWAS Trade Liberalization 
Scheme 
Absence of leadership Functional efficiency
Rent-seeking
ECOWAS Court of Justice Benevolent leadership (qualified) Democratization of Nigeria and 
signaling/legitimacy
Rent-seeking
SADC Free Trade Area Leadership, but unclear if benevo-
lent or coercive 
Functional efficiency 
(Economic) power concerns
SADC Tribunal Benevolent, then absent during 
anti-Tribunal campaign
Signaling/legitimacy (among 
different audiences)  
Source: Author.
The empirical analysis presented here is far from exhaustive, and more research into the financing and dis-
tribution of the costs and benefits of regional institutions is needed in order to more accurately categorize 
the behavior of regional powers, and the influence of the identified drivers in determining state behavior. 
Yet the findings illustrate that in both regions, the regional power faces challenges and resistance to its 
leadership attempts. Particularly in the realm of trade, secondary states fear domination by strong states, 
and in both cases have formed competing/overlapping regional initiatives intended to position them as 
“rule-makers” rather “rule-takers.” In ECOWAS, this strategy on the part of Francophone states has been 
successful, as they have been able to upload their pre-existing common external tariff bands to the wider 
region, regional power included. One doubts this is possible in southern Africa, not least because South 
Africa is already part of SACU and is highly unlikely to agree to align SACU’s tariffs to those of rival COMESA 
in order to create a SADC common external tariff. In any case, South Africa has proved itself unwilling to 
delegate authority to rule on SACU’s tariffs to a supranational agency such as a tariff board.  Both cases 
illustrate the relevance of rivalry and followship from secondary states in facilitating regional institutional-
ization, and suggest that secondary states play a stronger role than commonly assumed by realist under-
standings of regionalism.  
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